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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals in
domestic cases by way of Utah Code Annot. section
78~2a-3(h)(1991) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial Court erred in granting credits
toward Defendant's Child Support Obligation for payments made
by his father on debts of the parties?

Standard of Review
The standard of review to be applied in this issue is
the correctness standard, because even if there is no
document labeled "Conclusions of Law," paragraph 2 of the
document labelled "Findings of Fact," is clearly a conclusion
of law mislabeled. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing in-kind
credits toward child support obligations without a written
and signed agreement to that effect?

Standard of Review
The same standard of correctness must be applied to this
issue also, as the conclusion is one based on a matter of law
1

rather than a fact. Gene* al

GICUJC

Corp. v^ ma.st Constr. Co. .

754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3. Whether the trial court erred in not applying the
Statute of Frauds to the alleged agreement between the
parties that Defendant's father would make the payments

m

the place of Defendant?

Standard of review
Again the standard of correctness should be applied
rather than that of clear error because the question is one
of law rather than one of fact. Western Kane County Special
Serv. Dist. No. JL v\. Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah
1987).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Annot. sections 25-5-4(1),and 25-5-4<2)(1989):
The following agreements are void unl€>ss the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making of the
agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another;
Utah Code Annot. section 25-5-5(1953):
To charge a person upon a representation as to
the credit of a third person, such representation,
or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an Appeal from a civil Judgment and Order signed
by the Honorable R.W. Daines, acting District Judge in the
First Judicial District Court in Box Elder County, State of
Utah.

Course p_f the Proceedings and Disposition at the trial Court
This is a case where Plaintiff filed an Order to Show
Cause, seeking to hold the Defendant in Contempt of Court for
his failure to make Child Support payments and the reduction
of the back child support into a judgment.

Judgment was

entered in favor of Defendant, Jay Bradford, on the 21st day
of January, 1992. The Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal
on February 5, 1992.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Box Elder County, State of
Utah.

Defendant is a resident of the State of Montana. [See

Transcript of hearing held in Box Elder County Court House,
October 28, 1991, before Judge R.W. Daines,(hereinafter
referred to as Tr.) page 3 and 68].
2. Plaintiff obtained a divorce from the Defendant in
May of 1988, in Box Elder County, State of Utah, and
1

Plaintiff was awarded custody of the two minor children (Tr.
at 16) .
3. Defendant was ordered to pay child suoport in the sum
of $150.00 per month per child(Tr. at 72).
4. Defendant became delinquent in child support payments
as of October 28, 1991, in the sum of $9,149.00 (Tr. at 19).

5. Plainiff filed an Order to Show Cause in October.
1991, seeking contempt and a reduction of the delinquent
child support to a judgment against Defendant, which matter
came for hearing on October 28, 1991 before Judge Daines (Tr.
at 1) .
6. Defendant counterclaimed an offset from payments made
by his fnther toward the parties' bills and obligations (See
Tr. at 71 and 75-77).
7. The Transamerica, First Security Bank and R.C. Willey
debts were to be paid from a $5,000.00 note owed to the
parties on their Plain City home.

The note became delinquent

and Plaintiff sued on the note, and recovered $2,500.00 (Tr.
at 23)
8. Plaintiff paid the following debts of zhe parties:
Transamerica
First Security Bank
R.C. Willey
(Tr. at 24)

$ 178.24
$ 320.39
$1,076.12

9. Plaintiff also paid the following amounts on bills

and obligations that the Defendant had been ordered to pay:
Zions Bank
Dr. Wilding
Prescriptions
(Tr. at 19, 20, 23 and 34)

$800.00
$213.45
$294.00

10. The balance of the bills of the marriage, in the sum
of $5,551.33, were paid by the paternal grandfather (Tr. at
24, 57, 59, 71, 76).
11. The grandfather testified that at the time he made
the payments on the parties bills, he was attempting to "help
out" his former daughter-in-law and grandchildren (Tr. at
57-59).
12. The grandfather further testified that he did not
expect to be reimbursed by the Plaintiff.

He was making a

"gift" to his daughter-in-law and grandchildren without
expectation of reimbursement or that the Defendant would be
given credit against his delinquent child support obligations
(Tr. at 57-60).
13. Plaintiff claimed, at the contempt proceeding that
the Defendant had not paid $263.50 for the attorney fees on
the divorce decree, $1,775.00 paid by Plaintiff's parents on
obligations, $550.00 for a garbage trailer awarded to
Plaintiff, and $1,344.00 for one-half of day care (Tr. at 5,
12, 18, 29-30, 34, 36, 44).
14. The trial court allowed Defendant to offset against
Child Support the gratuitous monies paid by the paternal

grandfather uti the parties' bills and obligations (See
Findings of i-.ici. d«ited January 21,

L992, paragraph 6 ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when it
credited the payments made by Defendant's father toward the
back child support owed by Defendant.

It is well established

law in Utah that the child support arrangements cannot be
altered without the agreement of the custodial parent.

it is

also well established that the obligor on child support
cannot be given credit for in-kind payments.

If a parent

buys shoes for example, for the children, he will not receive
credit toward child support, unless the obligee agrees to
give him that credit.
If the Office of Recovery Services were seeking
reimbursement from the Defendant in this c.^se, he would not
have been given credit for the payments his father made on
the debts of the parties, unless there were a written
agreement, and even then it would have had to have been
approved by the Court to be recognized as parent for the
child support he is required to pay under the* decree.
The statute of frauds clearly applies to the case at
bar.

The Defendant claims an agreement for his father to pay

his obligations in child support, yet there vras no mention to
the plaintiff that such was the intent when she was apprised
of the Defendant's father making payments on the parties'

debts.

Such an agreement for the father to stand in the

place of the Defendant in his obligations to the Plaintiff
would have had to be in writing and signed by the Plaintiff
as well as the Defendant and the father.
Since the Court gave the Defendant credit toward his
obligations of child support for payments on debts owed by
both parties made by his Dad, the Court in all fairness
should have increased that amount or reduced the amount of
the debts to be paid by the Plaintiff by the amounts her own
parents had paid.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING OFF-SETS TO
CHILDSUPPORT OWED BY DEFENDANT FOR GRATUITOUS
PAYMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT'S FATHER.
THE COURT
ALSO ERRED IN ALLOWING IN-KIND CREDITS TOWARD CHILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT AN
EXPRESS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

It is an established rule that the obligor parent in a
divorce situation cannot substitute benefits which he gives
the children in any other form for the cash payments in set
amounts mandated by the decree of divorce in any particular
case.

The Utah Supreme Court in Harris v. Harris, 14 Utah 2d

96, 377 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1963) reiterated that rule when the
father attempted to justify his failure to pay the full
amounts as required by his maintenance of medical insurance
on the children and allowing the Plaintiff to deduct the
children on her income tax as dependents. M. . .We must

agree with plamliii: thai the decree did not authorize the
defendant to substitute benefits to the chilren for the
support payment ordered by the decree, and we be believe that
the trial court's conclusion

that defendant should be held in

contempt is supported by the law and evidence."
In Hills v^ Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981). the
Supreme Court struck down an agreement of the parties and an
order of the trial court which allowed future payments of
child support to discontinue under the condition that the
Defendant give up his parental rights and allow the
Plaintiff's second husband to adopt the children.

The second

husband never did adopt the children, thus t/ie Court never
did hold a hearing as to the termination of the rights of the
father and child support had to continue.

Trie Court said ".

. . The right to support from the parents belongs to the
minor children and is not subject to being bartered away,
extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the
agreement or conduct of the parents."
In Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977),
the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule that ". . .In this
jurisdiction alimony and support payments become unalterable
debts as they accrue; therefore, a periodic installment
cannot be changed or modified after the installments have
become due."
In Ross v^ Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court

again restated the rule against in-kind support

payments and this time emphasizes the necessity for the
agreement of the custodial parent to such changes.
". . . Plaintiff is not entitled, however to credit
for expenditures made on behalf of the children or
defendant which do not specifically conform to the
terms of the decree.10 To do so would permit
plaintiff to vary the terms of the decree and usurp
from defendant the right to determine the manner in
which the money should be spent.11 Only if the the
defendant has consented to the plaintiff's
voluntary expenditures as an alternative manner of
satisfying his alimony and child support
obligation, can plaintiff receive credit for such
expenditures.12"

Similar is the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
Stanton v^ Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1011, 1013-14
(1974).
". . . The general rule is that the decree fixes
the obligations of the parties; and that they
cannot modify it or change their obligations by
their conduct.9 Otherwise sometimes interfamily
tensions and machinations could make a shambles of
determining and enforcing the rights and duties of
the parties.
In the absence of any modification of the
decree, the support money accrued in accordance
with its terms; and it was not the prerogative of
the defendant to unilaterally decide that he would
not pay the support money and offset it by favors
conferred upon the children."

Most recent in the long line of cases reiterating the
rule of no in-kind credits without agreement of the parties
is the foot note number 4 in a case in which the Utah Court
of Appeals overturns the actions of the Office of Recovery
Services in not allowing credit where the Defendant allowed

Q

his ex-wife and children live in a hoiuie he owned in exchange
for credit toward his child support obligation and the wife
was on public assistance. Utah Dept. of Socia1 Services v.
Adams. 806 P. 2d 1195. 1196 (Utah App. 1<J91),
". . . W e hasten to add that the instant case is
atypical and in no way do we lend general support
to efforts to satisfy support obligations
"in-kind." The agreement here concerned property
that was easily valued and the children dearly
received a significant surplus. Mrs. Adams had
bargained for and acquiesced in the agreement and
the court and th^ Department had been notified of
i-he arrangement. Nothing in thiu opinion should
deter the Department from taking the pusiLion it
took here, albeit unjustifiably, in the more common
situation where a support obligor unilaterally
drops oj-'f -.second-hand clothes, canned I'ruit, or a
pair of skis and then purports to deduct his or her
view of the value thereof from support payments.
Indeed, it may safely be said that the Department's
fundamental position is sound—it just missed, by a
mile, the case in which to seek validation of that
position."

From the foregoing discussion of relevant caselaw, it is
obvious that in the instant case, the trial court erred
egregiously in allowing the Defendant credit toward his back
child support obligation for payments toward debts made by
the Defendant's father (Findings of Fact #'s 5 and 6 ) . There
must be a written or at least an oral agreement for the
obligor parent to substitute any such payments for his
obligation under the decree to pay child support as ordered.
If such an alteration is to be made he must confer with the
Custodial parent and receive her acknowledgement of such a
deal.

In the instant case there were no written or oral
agreements allowing any change in the way payments were to be
made (Tr. at 25). The Plaintiff did not know of any such
arrangement and definitely did not agree to Mr. Bradford
receiving credit toward his back child support for the
payments his father made gratuitously on behalf of the whole
family (Tr. at 25). It was not until the Plaintiff sought to
enforce her right to back child support that the idea of a
credit even was thought of, and then by Defendant's Counsel
as a defense to the action for contempt and judgment (Tr. at
15) .
The right to child support is one belonging to the
children and should have been protected by the court in this
situation, especially had the court found that there had
indeed been an agreement for the child support credit to be
made.

It would obviously be to the children's detriment to

allow their father to avoid paying his child support and also
to default on payments on family debts as occurred in this
case.

The grandfather did not want to see his grandchildren

left out in the cold and made the offer to pay off the debts
without being asked and without any thought of asking the
Plaintiff to pay the Defendant (Tr. at 57-60).

In giving the

credit for the grandfather's payments in this case, the trial
court has actually forced the Plaintiff to repay that gift or
loan to the Defendant by forcing her to forego back child
support which is hers according to the divorce decree in
11

addition to the contribution that the Defendant was to make
on the debts of the parties.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS TO THE THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE
DEFENDANT'S FATHER MADE PAYMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE
DEFENDANT.

It is clear that the agreement, if indeed there were one
by which the Defendant could obtain the substitution of his
father for himself in his debt for child support and default
on other obligations, would need to be in writing to binding
on the Plaintiff in a case such as this one.

Further,

according to the Utah Court of Appeals, the agreement to
allow credit for the payment of debts to be substituted for
actual cash child support payments must be in writing and
satisfy the statute of frauds.
In Brown y. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 334, 335, 336 (Utah
App. 1987), the Defendant tried to enforce a stipulation
purportedly agreed to by the Plaintiff through Court action.
The agreement provided that the alimony would be reduced and
then terminate as also the child support would increase and
then terminate within a set period of time.

The Plaintiff's

attorney had agreed to the stipulation, and the Plaintiff had
never signed it.
attorney.
-l-^^^^a

In fact she discontinued the service of her

The Defendant never produced the writing he

-u^^j T*~*m

=Tv.fl f i ^

+- ^

Kir f h n

Plaintiff

and

fhfi

Court

stated in pertinent part,
". . . Silence cannot be construed to be assent in
these circumstances. For a stipulation to be
binding, agreement by the parties must be evidenced
by a writing which would satisfy the statute of
frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on
the record before a judge. The facts in this case
do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no
stipulation reached between the parties and there
is nothing for the Court to enforce."

The court went on to say further, ". . . We will not go
around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to create a
stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200.00 per month by
plaintiff . . . ."

In the instant case the parties both

state that there was no agreement between the parties for the
grandfather to take the place of the Defendant in paying his
child support, or for the payment of debts as a favor by the
Grandfather of debts of the parties to cancel out the back
child support debts of the Defendant (Tr. at 25, 71-2).
There is only an agreement mentioned orally for the Defendant
to repay the amounts paid by the grandfather by him (Tr. at
57-60, 71). There being no writing as required, and there
being no contract allowing the interposition of Defendant's
father in his place to pay his obligations, the statute of
frauds bars any such implication of an agreement by the trial
court and the de facto imputation of such an agreement by the
court giving the Defendant credit for amounts paid by his
father on his just debts toward child support.
Further a brief glance at the statute of frauds will

show that an/ such agreement lor the interposition of the
grandfather in r.he place ut Defendant In paying his child
support or the allowance of in-kind credits would fail ity
requirements.

Utah Code Annot. :^echoi^ •":> -;> -4<:i j , and

25-5-4(2)(1989), in pertinent part states:
The following agreements .ire void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by i he party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement * hat by its terns is not to
be performed within one year from the making of the?
agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt,
default, ^r miscarriage of another:

Any agreement whieli would require the pasuing of more
than a year would violate the statute if not in writing.
This was one of the reasons that the Court in Brown stated
that the Statute of Frauds applys to child support and
alimony agreements.

Also as stated above the agreement for

the father to answer for the debt of the son must be in
writing and signed by the Plaintiff.
Further the statute in Utah Code Annot. section 25-5-5
(1953) requires a writing if another person is to be charged
with the debt of another and would also bar an agreement such
as that implicated by the Court in the instant situation,
To charge a person upon a representation as to
the credit of a third person, such representation,
or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.

Ill

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO PAY TOWARD PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE
DECREE AND THE AMOUNTS PAID BY PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS
AND THE VALUE OF THE LOSS OF THE GARBAGE TRAILER
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER THE ORIGINAL DECREE WHEN
FIGURING OUT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED TO PLAINTIFF
BY DEFENDANT AND GIVING HIM THE CREDITS TOWARD BACK
CHILD SUPPORT
The original decree in this case awarded the Plaintiff
with the garbage trailer (Tr. at 31-32) which was later
removed by the Defendant's father (Tr. at 32, 60). She paid
to have improvements made to it and she placed a value on it
of $500.00+ (Tr. at 33). The Trial Court disregarded this
evidence of expense in apportioning who owed what (Findings
of Fact, # 3). This should have been added to the amount to
be offset by the Defendant's supposed payments.
Defendant was ordered also in the divorce decree to pay
a certain amount of attorney fees of the Plaintiff in getting
the divorce (Tr. at 74). This he also failed to pay (Tr. at
74) and this amount was also left out of the figuring of the
Court in determing the total figure of Credits and offsets
(See transcript at 91-97, and Findings of Fact, no mention in
either place of the attorney fees).

The Court should be

reversed on this point and the case remanded for refiguring
of amounts offsetting each other on this point.
The Plaintiff's parents paid $1775.00 toward bills that
should have been paid by Defendant (Tr. at 28-30).

This

amount was also left out of the reckoning by Judge Daines and

15

should also be included in a redetermination by the Court as
to offsets (See Transcript and Findings of Fc.ct for fact that
this also was not considered because of lack of its mention
in either document).

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Plaintiff should prevail and asks
that the Court reverse the trial court's award of credit for
the gratuitous gifts of Defendant's father toward the Child
Support obligation he owes Plaintiff and remand for the Trial
Court to enter- a judgment against the Defendant in the amount
of back child support actually left unpaid after credit for
whatever has actually been paid through the withhold orders
of the Office of Recovery Services.
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, 1992

Respectfully Submitted,

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be mailed on
this

day of

vJ\oJm

, 1992 to:

Donald C. Hughes, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
298 24th St., Suite 125
Ogden. Utah 84401

DALlT~M* tfORlUfe

